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Conrail and Liquidation Value: Creditors' and
Stockholders' Entitlement in the
Regional Rail Reorganization
In the spring of 1973 a federal district judge in Pennsylvania su-
pervising the reorganization of the Penn Central railroad warned that
the debtor's estate of the railroad was being overwhelmed by operating
losses and that train service might have to cease.' The prospect2 spurred
passage by Congress of a new statute for handling railroad insolvency,
the Regional Rail Reorganization Act.3 One troublesome question
raised by the legislation concerns what compensation must be paid
1. In re Penn Cent. Transp. Co., 355 F. Supp. 1343 (E.D. Pa. 1973) (Fullam, J.).
2. Penn Central has been the major rail carrier in the Northeast and Midwest. It
serves 55 percent of all manufacturing plants in the United States, and is the leading
carrier of coal, metals, chemicals, automobiles, manufactured consumer goods, and mail.
Regional Rail Reorganization Act Cases, 419 U.S. 102, 117 n.12 (1974); H.R. REP. No.
93-620, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 26 (1973). A study in 1973 by the United States Department
of Transportation estimated that an actual abandonment of service by Northeast carriers
would cause a 2.7 percent drop in Gross National Product within two months and a
3.0 percent rise in unemployment. Cited in id.; S. REP. No. 93-601, 93d Cong., 1st Sess.
8 (1973).
3. 45 U.S.C. §§ 701-93 (Supp. IV 1974) [hereinafter cited as Rail Act]. The Rail Act
was intended to supplement the traditional vehicle for reorganization of insolvent in-
terstate railroads, § 77 of the Bankruptcy Act, 11 U.S.C. §§ 205-205a (1970), by pro-
viding a way to consolidate into one operating company the more profitable lines of
various insolvent roads in the Northeast. The Rail Act also provided for the rapid
abandonment or sale of lines not suitable for such inclusion, and supplied funds for
the restoration of roadbed and track and the satisfaction of protective labor conditions.
In contrast, in a traditional § 77 reorganization, the reorganization trustee and court
can do little more than scale down the capital structure of the individual railroad; per-
mission to abandon service on some of the railroad's less profitable lines must be sought
in separate lengthy ICC proceedings.
For a brief description of the Rail Act and its planning processes, see G. HILTON, THE
NORTHEAST RAILROAD PROBLEM 29-43 (Am. Enterprise Inst. for Pub. Pol'y Res. 1975).
On the operation of § 77, see H. GUTH.%TANN & H. DOUGALL, CORPORATE FINANCIAL
POLICY 652-54, 663 (1955); Barber, Railroad Reorganization, Section 77, and the Need
for Legislative Reform, 21 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 553 (1973); Fuller, The Background and
Techniques of Equity and Bankruptcy Railroad Reorganizations-A Survey, 7 LAW &
CorErcMP. PROD. 377, 384-92 (1940); Haskell, Railroad Reorganization for Beginners, 24
ALA. L. Rcv. 295, 296-303 (1972); Swaine, A Decade of Railroad Reorganization under
Section 77 of the Federal Bankruptcy .Act, 56 HARv. L. REv. 1193 (1943). For a history
of the evolution of the earlier equity receiverships, see II A. DEWING, THE FINANCIAL
POLICY OF CORPORATIONS 1228-56 (5th ed. 1953); H. GUTIMANN & H. DOUGALL, suplra at
646, 648; Fuller, supra at 378-84.
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to the creditors and stockholders of the insolvent roads included un-
der the Act. 4 Congress has attempted to salvage the Northeastern rail-
roads by stepping outside the framework of wholly private reorgani-
zation, instead providing a transfusion of federal loans and requiring
the conveyance of rail assets from the insolvent roads to the Con-
solidated Rail Corporation (Conrail), a federally created company
in which the creditors and stockholders will receive participations.
In such an assisted reorganization, is it a "taking '' to accord credi-
tors and stockholders securities and other benefits worth less than the
liquidation value0 of the rail assets retained in the reorganized rail
system? The problem of defining the entitlement of creditors and
stockholders will be addressed for the first time by the Special Court
under Judges Friendly, Wisdom, and Thomsen in litigation in 1976.
7
4. The operating railroads included in the Conrail reorganization ale tile Penn Cen-
tral, Erie Lackawanna, Lehigh Valley, Reading, Central of New Jersey, Lehigh and
Hudson, and Ann Arbor.
5. "[N]or shall private property be taken for public use, without just compensation."
U.S. CONST. amend. V.
6. "Liquidation value" refers to the amount ulhich can be realized by the sale of rail
assets for their most profitable use. This may include sale to other types of businesses
or to other railroads. If the assets can be used most profitably in existing rail operation,.
then their liquidation value is of course equal to present going-concein Nalue. But to
keep the terms distinct, this Note will use "'liquidation value" only to describe tile
amount realized by sale of rail assets for use outside the original railroad enterplise.
See New Haven Inclusion Cases, 399 U.S. 392, 489, 492 (1970); II J. BONBRCUHT, Tin.
VALUATION OF PROPERTY 759, 762 (1937); I A. DLWING. supra note 3, at 373-75. Unless
otherwise specified, references are to net liquidation value-that is, the gross proceeds of
sale reduced by the expenses of liquidation. If the assets would realize the greatest
amount when sold gradually, the proceeds must also be discounted to present lalue.
The liquidation value of the claims of any class of bondholders, unsecured creditors,
or stockholders depends not only on the size of the estate of the debtor, but on the rule by
which the proceeds of its sale are distributed among classes. In a straight bankruptcy
proceeding, the claims of each class are treated as matured by the debtor's default
or petition for bankruptcy. The proceeds of the estate are used first to pay off the
principal and accrued interest of the most senior class of bondholders (those with prior
liens on the -debtor's property), then the claims of subordinated bondholders and the
unsecured creo1itors. Any proceeds that remain revert to the stockholders' residual in-
terest in tli,' -business. In the forms of reorganization traditionally used for railroad
insolvencies-the, equity receivership and its successor, § 77-the practice of treating
claims as matured was imported from the straight bankruptcy analogy, with the enun-
ciation of- thb "absolute priority rule." Ecker v. Western Pac. R.R., 318 U.S. 448, 483
(1943); Northern Pac. Ry. v. Boyd, 228 U.S. 482, 504-05 (1913). Even though the business
is to be continued, the participations in the new enterprise are allocated in the same
manner as the proceeds of a liquidation. The most senior class is to be paid off in full
on the principal and accrued interest of its claim before any more junior class is allowed
participation.
The absolute priority rule, however, has only governed the allocation of ialue anong
classes. The rule does not specify that full "liquidation value" must be accorded to
the debtor's estate as a whole.
7. The conveyance of designated rail assets to Conrail is presently expected to occur
about April 1, 1976. Wall St. J., Feb. 13, 1976, at 2, col. 2. The entry of the conveyance
order by the Special Court will trigger a valuation proceeding: after conveyance, the
Special Court is required by statute to decide whether each exchange of properties for
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The question was not passed on by the Supreme Court in the first
Rail Act decision in 1974, the Regional Rail Reorganization Act Cases.8
Nor is it rendered moot by the statutory provisions for payment in
the Rail Act, for the Act provides that no more than the "constitutional
minimum" shall be paid to the rail estates.9 Because of the prevalence
of the view that the creditors and stockholders of a railroad are con-
stitutionally entitled in a bankruptcy reorganization to the full liqui-
Conrail securities and other benefits is "in the public interest" and "fair and equitable"
to the estate of each railroad in accord with the standards of fairness and equity neces-
sary for approval of a plan of reorganization under § 77. Rail Act § 303(c)(1)(A), 45
U.S.C. § 743(c)(1)(A) (Supp. IV 1974).
If the terms of any exchange are not fair and equitable, thc Special Court has some
power to adjust the compensation by reallocating securities among the railroads, or-
dering the transfer of any undistributed Conrail securities or United States Railway Asso-
ciation obligations, or entering a judgment against Conrail. Rail Act § 303(c)(2), 45 U.S.C.
§ 743(c)(2) (Supp. IV 1974). Such measures, however, would have little real effect in increas-
ing the value of securities and other compensation received by the rail estates. See In re
Penn Cent. Transp. Co., 384 F. Supp. 895, 929-31 (Regional Rail Reorg. Spec. Ct. 1974);
Regional Rail Reorganization Act Cases, 419 U.S. 102, 167 (1974) (Douglas, J., dissenting).
If there is a shortfall in compensation, and the amount cannot be remedied by the
Special Court's limited powers, it is then expected that the rail estates, on behalf of
their creditors and stockholders, will file suit in the Court of Claims under the Tucker
Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1491 (Supp. IV 1974). Such a supplemental remedy was found to be avail-
able in the initial Rail Act litigation, thus preserving the constitutionality of the Act.
Regional Rail Reorganization Act Cases, supra at 125-36, 148.
Whether the Special Court judgment will have preclusive effect on the Court of
Claims litigation probably depends on whether the Supreme Court chooses to hear
the appeal which can be taken from the Special Court's judgment. (By the terms of
the Rail Act, the Supreme Court can dismiss the appeal if it "would not be in the
interest of an expeditious conclusion of the proceedings." Rail Act § 303(d), 45 U.S.C.
§ 743(d) (Supp. IV 1974).) The parties in Court of Claims litigation would be different
fhom those bound by the Special Court judgment-suit under the Tucker Act has to be
brought against the United States rather than Conrail-so the formal collaterally estop-
ping effect of the judgment would be limited. But any Supreme Court determination of
the constitutionally minimum level of compensation would effectively conclude the ques-
tion in subsequent litigation.
8. 419 U.S. 102 (1974). The Court did note the "distinct possibility" that the estate
of Penn Central might suffer a taking, in light of the huge $851 million net loss suf-
fered by Penn Central between mid-1970 and 1973, id. at 124, and the risk that the re-
organization plan for Conrail might not be implemented within a reasonable period. But
the question of how to value the properties transferred to Conrail was specifically
reserved. Id. at 147 n.34. The Special Court also left the question open. In re Penn Cent.
Transp. Co., 384 F. Supp. 895, 928 n.61 (Regional Rail Reorg. Spec. Ct. 1974).
9. If the special court finds that the terms of one or more conveyances or ex-
changes for securities or other benefits are fairer and more equitable than is
iequired as a constitutional ,ninhiniu, then it shall order the return of any excess
securities, obligations, or compensation to the [Consolidated Rail] Corporation or
a profitable railroad so as not to exceed the constitutional minimum standard of
fairness and equity.
Rail Act § 303(c)(3), 45 U.S.C. § 743(c)(3) (Supp. 1V 1974) (emphasis added). See also
id. § 303(c)(1)(B), 45 U.S.C. § 743(c)(l)(B) (Supp. IV 1974). The directive to the Special
Court to recapture any compensation above the constitutional minimum amounts to a
prospective incorporation of the court's decision on what constitutes a taking in the
Rail Act reorganization. Thus, even if Conrail is extremely successful, with prospects
of high going-concern value, the constitutional question of the minimum compensation
due creditors and stockholders in a reorganization apparently must be reached.
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dation value of the carrier's property,' it seems appropriate to examine
the constitutional and historical plausibility of the claim.
I. The Interests of Creditors and Stockholders
vs. the Interest of Rail Users
The situation of the Northeastern railroads has exposed the possible
opposition between the interests of railroad creditors and stockholders
in the recovery of their investment and the interest of the public in
continued service. In earlier railroad insolvencies the use of federal
bankruptcy power to suspend creditors' foreclosure rights and effect
a reorganization did not always pose the conflict so clearly. If the
going-concern value of a railroad exceeded the liquidation value of
its assets for nonrail purposes, then junior creditors and perhaps even
the stockholders would benefit by continuation of the enterprise as
much as would the railroad's patrons.
10. In the initial litigation in 1974 over the constitutionality of the Regional Rail
Reorganization Act establishing Conrail, Judge Fullam, as part of the three-judge district
court which held the Act unconstitutional, took the position in his concurrence that
the projected value of the securities accorded the rail estates must be "at least liquida-
tion value [of the assets] plus interim erosion." Connecticut Gen. Ins. Corp. v. United
States Ry. Ass'n, 383 F. Supp. 510, 533 (E.D. Pa. 1974) (footnote omitted) (Fullam, J.,
concurring), rev'd on other grounds sub nlom. Regional Rail Reorganization Act Cases,
419 U.S. 102 (1974).
The Penn Central and New Haven bankruptcy trustees have contended that the
constitutional minimum is at least liquidation value. See Brief for Appellants, Trustees
of the Property of Penn Cent. Transp. Co., at 55, Regional Rail Reorganization Act
Cases, supra ("Fair market value is the constitutional minimum because . . . if a
railroad has neither earnings nor the reasonable prospect of earnings, its owners hae
a constitutional right to withdraw their property from operation by them as a railroad
and to realize the value obtainable from its sale."); Brief of Cross-Appellant, Trustee
of the Property of New York, N.H. & H.R.R., at 61-68. Regional Rail Reorganization
Act Cases, supra.
In the appeal from the three-judge Connecticut General decision, the United States
Railway Association (USRA) contended that payment of liquidation value was not consti-
tutionally required if a "profitable" reorganization could be effected through Conrail.
USRA instead proposed payment of "substantial going-concern" value as sufficient. See
Brief of Appellee and Cross-Appellee United States Ry. Ass'n at 11, Regional Rail Re.
organization Act Cases, supra ("[Wjhere a railroad can be reorganized to have a substantial
going-concern value, that value is the measure of the investors' rights even if net li-
quidation value would be higher.") However, in the "Final System Plan" for or-
ganizing Conrail, issued by the Railway Association on July 26, 1975, and allowed to
become effective on November 8, 1975, by Congress's inaction (N.Y. Times, Nov. 9, 1975
at 1, col. 5), USRA offered no conclusion about the constitutional minimum deserved
by rail estates in a reorganization. I UNITED STATES RAILWAY ASSOCIATION, FINAL SYsTEM
PLAN 122-23 (July 26, 1975) [hereinafter cited as FINAL SySTE.t PLAN].
See Comment, The Secured Creditor's Right to Full Liquidation Value in Corporate Re-
organization, 42 U. CHI. L. REv. 510, 529 (1975) ("Although the remedial rights of a
secured creditor can be regulated in the interest of accomplishing successful corporate
reorganizations, such regulation violates the fifth amendment of the Constitution when
it impairs the liquidation value of the creditor's lien without compensation."); Note,
Takings and the Public Interest in Railroad Reorganization, 82 YALE L.J. 1001, 1005
(1973) (creditors constitutionally entitled to pre-bailkruptcy liquidation value).
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The condition of the railroads to be included in Conrail is quite
different. Penn Central has had no net operating income for at least
five years." In contrast, the net liquidation value of Penn Central
rail properties may be as high as $1.99 billion.1 2 It is true that the
Rail Act reorganization has been designed to allow a major restructur-
ing of rail operations and could justify more optimistic income pros-
pects; both Penn Central creditors and the United States Railway
Association agree that Conrail can be operated to have some net in-
come by 1985.1: But estimates of Conrail's income vary widely, and
the Special Court may very possibly conclude that the going-concern
value underlying the distributed Conrail securities is less than the
liquidation value of the assets transferred to Conrail.
11. Penn Central had net operating income from its rail operations in only one year
between 1964 and 1970. Its loss on rail services reached a pre-bankruptcy high of $193
million in 1969. See STAFF REPORT OF THE SEC TO THE SPECIAL SUBCOMM. ON INVESTIGATIONS,
HOUSE COIMI. ON INTERSTATE AND FOREIGN CO'MMERCE, THE FINANCIAL COLLPSE OF THE
PENN CENTRAL COMPANY 86 (Subcomm. Print 1972). Overall losses have continued through-
out Penn Central's reorganization. Net losses were $189 million in 1973, and $198 million
in 1974. N.Y. Times, Feb. 20, 1975, at 43, col. 1.
The bankruptcies of the Penn Central and other Northeastern carriers ha~e stemmed
from a number of causes: intense competition from trucking and air transport, a decline
in the industrial activity of the Northeast as a major source of freight demand, and
imbalanced federal aid to transportation. The decline in railroads' competitive position
has been self-sustaining; operating deficits have led to undermaintenance of equipment
and track, which in turn has increased operating expenses. See S. REP. No. 93-601,
supra note 2, at 6-14; SPECIAL STUDY GROUP ON TRANSP. POLICIES IN THE UNITED ST.TESr,
SENATE COMM. ON INTERSTATE AND FOREIGN COMMERCE, 87TH CONG., IST SESS., NATIONAL
TRANSPORTATION POLICY 67-81 (Comm. Print 1961); G. HILTON, supra note 3, at 3-21;
Barber, supra note 3, at 553-67; Meyer & Morton, The U.S. Railroad Industry in the
Post-World War 11 Period: A Profile, 2 EXPLORATIONS IN ECONOMIC RESEARCH 449,
-150-68 (Nat'l Bur. Econ. Res. 1975).
12. This figure excludes various nonrail assets such as Penn Central's Park Avenue
properties in New York City. PCTC Physical Asset Valuation Study (Apr. 1973, revised
May 30, 1973), cited in In re Penn Cent. Transp. Co., 3M F. Supp. 895, 924 nA7 (Re-
gional Rail Reorg. Spec. CL 1974). The study was commissioned by the Penn Central
trustees.
Table I (following page) presents other estimates of the liquidation %alue, book value,
and net investment in transportation property of each of the seven railroads in Conrail.
13. USRA has predicted that net annual income applicable to Conrail common stock
will become positive in 1980 and will reach $267 million (in inflated dollars) by 1985.
I FINAL SYSTEM PLAN, supra note 10, at 51. Penn Central has challenged USRA's income
figures. According to Penn Central, USRA's projections show post-interest income of
S280 million (in 1973 dollars) by 1985, while Penn Central predicts only $23 million. Sec
Statement of the Penn Central Trustees on the United States Railway Association's
Final System Plan, Sept. 16, 1975, App. at 6 (on file with Yale Law Journal). The dif-
ference, according to Penn Central, lies largely in USRA's projections of increased freight
revenues. Id. at 2-4, 6.
Conrail's chances for profitable operation were apparently improved by the recent de-
cision of the Chessie System not to purchase 2,000 miles of track held by the Erie
Lackawanna, Reading, and Penn Central railroads. The Chessie acquisition would have
provided significant competition to Conrail in bidding for freight traffic. N.Y. Times,
Feb. 13, 1976, at 45, col. 8; Wall St. J., Feb. 13, 1976, at 2, col. 2.
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Conrail and Liquidation Value
A. The Claims: Erosion Taking and Conveyance Taking
The assertion that creditors and stockholders of an insolvent railroad
have a Fifth Amendment right to receive at least liquidation value
in a reorganization has been raised in two forms. The first is the
claim of "erosion taking"-that requiring deficit operations by the rail-
roads pending inclusion in Conrail has unfairly reduced the portion
of the estates available to satisfy creditors and stockholders in any
eventual dissolution,'1 4 thus constituting a taking of the amount erod-
ed. The second concerns the compensation ultimately received for
transferred assets. When the Conrail system becomes operative in early
1976 by a conveyance of various assets from the old railroads to Con-
rail, the debtors' estates of the railroads-and through them the old
secured creditors, unsecured creditors, and stockholders'a-will receive
participations in the Conrail system in the form of preferred and
common stock,'0 underwritten by a $450 million federal guarantee.' 7
The railroads have argued that insofar as the value of the securities
falls short of the liquidation value of the assets conveyed, the deficit
will constitute a "conveyance taking."' 8
B. "Taking" as Shortfall in a Reorganization
The creditors are certainly correct in asserting that the possibility
of a taking is inherent in the Rail Act. This is so simply by virtue
of the conclusion that creditors and stockholders of the bankrupt
14. Rail Act § 304(f), 45 U.S.C. § 744(f) (Supp. IV 1974), required that any railroad
potentially included within Conrail maintain rail service pending completion of the
Final S)stem Plan unless USRA authorized the abandonment and "no affected State
or local or regional transportation authority reasonably oppose[d] such action."
The erosion might have occurred through the accumulation of taxes and administrative
expenses, both of which have priority over the claims of secured creditors; the issuance
of trustee's certificates to raise cash for deficit operations, again with priority over
creditors; and postponed maintenance. See In re Penn Cent. Transp. Co., 384 F. Supp.
895, 923-25 (Regional Rail Reorg. Spec. Ct. 1974); Regional Rail Reorganization Act
Cases, 419 U.S. 102, 124 (1974).
15. Compensation for assets transferred to Conrail from insolvent railroads will be
paid directly to the trustees of the estates of the railroads, and subsequently be dis-
tributed to the creditors and stockholders having claims against or interests in the
estates. See Rail Act § 303(c)(4), 45 U.S.C. § 743(c)(4) (Snpp. IV 1974).
16. Each estate is to be allocated shares of Conrail Series B preferred stock on the
basis of the net liquidation value of the assets it has transferred to Conrail. (The liq-
uidation value is to be calculated as of the date of transfer.) In addition, each estate
will receive common stock based on its prospective contribution toward the "excess
earnings" of Conrail-that is, projected earnings exceeding the amount necessary to service
the Government's loans and the Series B preferred stock. I FINAL SYSTEM PLAN, supra
note 10, at 137).
17. Id. at 135. These "Certificates of Value" can be reduced in amount if the con-
stitutional minimum to which the rail estates are entitled should be less than the
amount of the guarantees. Id. at 138.
18. See briefs of the Penn Central and New Haven railroads cited in note 10 supra.
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railroads must have some minimum constitutional entitlement in the
assets which constitute the estates of the railroads. The interim con-
tinuation of deficit operations and the transfer of the railroad assets
to Conrail are mandatory steps' 9 completed before any determination
of the value of Conrail's securities and other benefits.20
But the fact that some taking may occur should not short-circuit
the puzzling question of when the taking arises, that is, the magnitude
of creditors' and stockholders' entitlement in the Conrail reorganiza-
tion. The possibility of a taking cannot lead to an easy conclusion
that liquidation value is the entitlement, for the basic design of the
Rail Act has been held to be an exercise of bankruptcy power, not
of eminent domain.2 1 Mandatory conveyance of rail properties to
19. Rail Act §§ 206(d)(1), 303(b)(1), 304(f), 45 U.S.C. §§ 716(d)(1), 743(b)(1), 744(f)
(Supp. IV 1974).
20. See id. § 303(c)(1), 45 U.S.C. § 743(c)(1) (Supp. IV 1974).
21. I]here is nothing in the Act fundamentally at odds with the expressed pur-
pose of Congress to supplement the reorganization laws . . . and, with the Tucker
Act, the Rail Act is valid as a reorganization statute.
Regional Rail Reorganization Act Cases, 419 U.S. 102, 150 (1974). This conclusion was
reached in rejecting the claim of the rail estates that compensation had to be given in
cash rather than in securities because the Rail Act was an eminent domain or con-
demnation statute. In the Court's view, Conrail was properly characterized as a method
of reorganization despite the Rail Act's provisions for federal representation on Conrail's
board of directors and for a compulsory conveyance of properties to Conrail that dis-
penses with the vote of creditors required in a § 77 proceeding. Id. at 152-54.
Some aspects of this characterization are debatable. In holding that federal reple-
sentation on the Conrail board of directors is not sufficient to make Conrail a federal
instrumentality, the Court noted that the federal appointees would serve only so long
as federally guaranteed debentures constituted 50 percent or more of Conrail's indebt-
edness. Id. at 152. Yet it is the provision of federally guaranteed debt which allows
the railroads to be regarded as reorganizable in the first place. In addition, one
might expect in practice that the eight federally appointed directors will not balance
public and private interests in the same manner as would the seien privately elected
directors. Federal directors might, for instance, more vigorously support measures which
defer immediate earnings in favor of reinvestment in improved service.
Still, the fiduciary responsibilities of federal directors toward the private shareholders
are in theory the same as those of private directors. And the federal goveinment's in-
terest in having some voice in the administration of its capital contribution is under-
standable in light of the heavy criticism of Penn Central's management and accounting
practices in the period before bankruptcy. Nor was the phenomenon of some federal
control over railroad management unknown in previous railroad reorganizations under
§ 77. In the 1930's and 1940's, the Reconstruction Finance Corporation (RFC) functioned
as a source of credit for ailing railroads both before and after insolvency. T)picall), the
credit of the railroad was so low that no new private money could be raised to refund
RFC loans; the RFC was instead paid off in junior securities of the reorganized railroad.
and given some representation on the board of directors. As Dewing has noted:
This situation was conspicuously true of . . . the large, Class I roads. The gov-
ernment, through its instrumentality, the Reconstruction Finance Corporation, must
accept securities of the new road . . . . In consequence . . . the government became
a partner in the enterprise and supplied one or more directors to the board of the
reorganized road. . . . [A]nd . . . through the power of its loans was in a position
to dominate the policy of the reorganized road.
1I A. DEwING, supra note 3, at 1263 (footnotes omitted).
The Court does seem on solid ground in finding the mandatory character of the
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Conrail, as a corporation retaining substantial private character,
does not constitute a condemnation of property by the Government.
Nor does the fact that Conrail is being aided by federal loans and
other measures serve to remove the proceeding from the frame of
reorganization, or increase creditors' and stockholders' entitlement
above that of a traditional reorganization.2 -
In a § 77 reorganization, the conveyance of rail assets to a reor-
ganized corporation normally does not give rise to a taking, because
the reorganization is supposed to go forward only when the securities
distributed in exchange for those assets are of sufficient value to meet
creditors' and stockholders' constitutional entitlement in a reorganiza-
conveyance insufficient to take the statute out of tile bankruptcy power. Section 77
has traditionally provided for the confirmation of a reorganization plan over the protest
of creditors holding up to one-third in amount of any class of securities and even, by
use of the "cram-down" power, over the objection of a majority of any class, so long
as the plan is "fair and equitable." Bankruptcy Act § 77(e), 11 U.S.C. § 205(e) (1970);
Reconstruction Fin. Corp. v. Denver & R.G.W.R.R., 328 U.S. 495, 531-33 (1946). In
practice, a cram-down over the protest of a large dissenting vote of creditors might
seem unlikely. See 14 U. Cni. L. REv. 84, 91 (1946). But the occasion may not often
have arisen because of the acceptance of the view that railroads are subject to re-
organization if any plan is workable.
22. The Final System Plan calls for S1.85 billion federal investment in Conrail be-
tween 1976 and 1981. I FINAL SYsrEt PLN, supra note 10, at 135. This amount may
increase to $2.03 billion because of the Chessie's withdrawal from purchase of trackage.
Wall St. J., Feb. 13, 1976, at 2, col. 3. The first part of this funding was authorized
early in 1976. Id., Feb. 6, 1976, at 2, col. 3. This loan aid finds some analogy in
the funding obtained in § 77 reorganizations from private lending institutions, or in
the 1930's and 1940's, from loan programs of the Reconstruction Finance Corporation.
In addition, similar loan guarantees of up to SI billion for acquisition and rehabilitation
of facilities are provided by 1976 legislation to all railroads in the nation. N.Y. Times,
Feb. 5, 1976, at 45, col. 6. Recent legislation authorizing a $1.6 billion direct grant for
the rehabilitation of roadbed in the Boston-to-Washington corridor is intended mainly
to aid the development of high speed passenger service by Amtrak and will have only
incidental benefits for freight operations. Id. at 45, col. 5.
Nor should the $450 million federal guarantee of the value of Conrail preferred
and common stock necessarily change the standard of entitlement-the rail estates can
hardly complain that the hazard of predictions about future income is being assumed
by the Government. Still, it is arguable that if at the time of the Special Court's
estimate the projected earnings-based value of Conrail is less than the amount constitu-
tionally required to sustain a reorganization, the rail estates should receive an amount
close to liquidation value. (Were one to hold that tile "reorganization minimum" could be
met through payment in cash via a Tucker Act remedy, or in guaranteed Certificates
of Value, then any line between valuation in reorganization and in condemnation would
become confused. A property incapable of earning any net operating income at all
would be "reorganizable.") For a similar view, see I FINAL SYsrEa.N PLAN, supra note 10,
at 123.
An alternative position is that where railroad properties are capable of earning any
net operating income, creditors and stockholders should be entitled only to the con-
stitutional minimum required for reorganization. The "taking" would consist only of
the difference between the earnings-based going-concern value and the minimum neces-
sary for reorganization, rather than the difference between earnings-based going-concern
value and liquidation value.
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tion proceeding 2 3 Similarly, in the Conrail transfer, no taking will
arise so long as the value of the Conrail securities is sufficient to meet
creditors' and stockholders' constitutional entitlement in a railroad's
estate in reorganization.2 4 (The estates of the bankrupt -railroads have
been remitted to a suit under the Tucker Act in the Court of Claims
to make up for any shortfall in value.23 )
II. The Brooks-Scanlon 'Right to Retrieve'
The argument that liquidation value is the due of creditors and
stockholders in a reorganization proceeding rests principally on an
early line of cases which address the right to 'retrieve' property from
,unprofitable' uses.
The cases are three: Brooks-Scanlon v. Railroad Commission,203
Bullock v. Florida ex rel. Railroad Commission,2 7 and Railroad Con-
mission v. Eastern Texas Railroad.28 While Brooks-Scanlon and Eastern
Texas do involve the Supreme Court's approval of the abandonment
of whole railroads against the opposition of state regulatory commis-
sions, their import is subject to major qualification. Contrary to some
commentators, 29 the 'right to retrieve' of these cases does not establish
liquidation value as creditors' invariable due. First, and most impor-
tant, the railroads involved seem to have been hopelessly unprofitable,
with no prospect of rehabilitation to a break-even point on either a
private or publicly-assisted basis. They appear to have been operating
at a loss not simply in the sense of having no income available for
equity after payment of some charges for the use of capital, such as
bond interest, but in having no net railway operating income3" at all. 31
23. Under § 77(e), I1 U.S.C. § 205(e) (1970), the judge must find a plan to be
"fair and equitable" before the plan can be confirmed. See Regional Rail Reorganization
Act Cases, 419 U.S. 102, 154-55 (1974); id. at 183 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
24. Regional Rail Reorganization Act Cases, 419 U.S. 102, 155 (1974).
25. id. at 136, 148.
26. 251 U.S. 396 (1920).
27. 254 U.S. 513 (1921).
28. 264 U.S. 79 (1924).
29. Comment, supra note 10, at 514; Note, supra note 10, at 1008-10, 1018, 1020.
30. Net operating income is calculated before any charges are made for the use (f
capital, such as interest on debt and leased line rentals. However, it does include pay-
rments on equipment leases. See In re Penn Cent. Transp. Co., 384 F. Supp. 895,
925 (Regional Rail Reorg. Spec. Ct. 1974); ICC, 87TH ANNUAL REPORT ON TRANSPORT
STATISTICS IN THE UNITED STATES 50 (Table 156(D)), 56-59 (Table 161) (1973).
31. In Brooks-Scanlon, the railroad was said to be unable to run "except at a loss
of more than S1500 a month." Brooks-Scanlon Co. v. Railroad Comm'n, 251 U.S. 396.
397 (1920). Neither the Brooks-Scanlon Company nor its subsidiary, the Kentwood and
Eastern Railway Company, which actually operated the road, appears to have had any
bondholders. 144 La. 1086, 1090-91, 81 So. 727, 728-29 (1919). Hence the loss was inde-
pendent of debt service or other return on capital. Although the Kentwood Company
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That a railroad's investors cannot be required to keep up operations
at an out-of-pocket loss where rehabilitation has been shown to be im-
possible does not establish a right to retrieve their capital if, by con-
solidating some operations and abandoning others, a relatively profit-
able operation can be effected. 2
Second, in Bullock and Eastern Texas there was no prior legislation
supporting a duty to continue rail operations for a period of time
despite losses,33 an omission which Justice Holmes seems to have found
leased the railroad from its parent Brooks-Scanlon Company and thus was obligated as
a short term expense for the amount of the lease, the road seems clearly to have been
running at a loss even before the lease payment.
The plaintiff [Brooks-Scanlon Company] may be making money from its sawmill
and lumber business but it no more can be compelled to spend that than it can
be compelled to spend any other money to maintain a railroad for the benefit of
others who do not care to pay for it.
251 U.S. at 399 (emphasis added).
In Bullock, the Ocklawaha Valley Railroad was in default on its mortgage bonds. A
state court found that it "could not be operated so as to have any net income whatever,"
Bullock v. Florida ex rel. Railroad Commns, 254 U.S. 513, 519 (1921), but it is not clear
whether this meant before or after debt service. The foreclosure decree in dispute, issued
by a lower Florida court, did not recognize an unburdened right to liquidation value;
it required that the road first be offered for sale as a common carrier. Only if all bids
for use as a common carrier were under 5,200,000 could the railroad be offered for
sale with the privilege of dismantling, and a bid for dismantling could not be accepted
unless at least S100,000 over the bids for use as a common carrier. Id. at 520. Thus if
scrap value of the railroad was S300,000, the bondholders' estate could be deprived of
up to one-third its ialue before any objectionable burden was found by the state court.
If the scrap value was S100,000, the bondholders could be deprived of over 99 percent
of its value-in the interest of selling the railroad as a going concern. There was in
fact no bid for the railroad as a going concern, State ex rel. Railroad Comm'rs v. Bullock,
78 Fla. 321, 324, 82 So. 866, 866-67 (1919), suggesting that it had no net operating income
whatever, even before hypothetical debt service.
In Eastern Texas, the railroad's property
was offered for sale at .50,000 to any one who would operate the road, and the
offer was widely advertised, but without eliciting any acceptance or bid. Essential
repairs would cost 9185,000. The operating cost would be as much as ;84,000 per
year; the possible revenue from all traffic would not exceed S50,000 ....
Railroad Comm'n v. Eastern Tex. R.R., 264 U.S. 79, 83 (1924). The Eastern Texas
Railroad did not have any mortgage debt issued against its property or other debt; hence
its "operating loss" was exclusive of debt service. Texas v. Eastern Tex. R.R., 283 F. 584,
588 (W.D. Tex. 1922).
32. The right to retrieve recognized by Justice Holmes was qualified accordingly.
A past history of losses was not sufficient to establish a constitutional right to abandon.
There also had to be "no reasonable prospect of profitable operation in the future."
Bullock v. Florida ex rel. Railroad Comm'n, 254 U.S. 513, 521 (1921). See also justice Van
Devanter's formulation in Railroad Comm'n v. Eastern Tex. R.R., 264 U.S. 79, 85 (1924)
("[I]f at any time it develops with reasonable certainty that future operation must be
at a loss, the company may discontinue operation ....") (emphasis added).
33. See Bullock v. Florida ex rel. Railroad Comm'n, 254 U.S. 513, 520 (1921) ("The de-
cision of the [state] Court proceeds upon a doctrine as to the duty of the railroad
company, again a duty not based upon statute. ... )- Railroad Comm'n v. Eastern
Tex. R.R., 264 U.S. 79, 87-89 (1924) (statutory provisions relied on by the railroad
commission did not specify any duty of railroad to continue operations).
In Brooks-Scanlon, the state supreme court decided that the carrier was not running
at a loss if one lumped together the Brooks-Scanlon Company's railroad and nonrailroad
business; the Supreme Court reversed on the ground that such aggregation was improper.
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significantA' In the early regulation of railroads, states often relied
on franchise grants to impose quasi-contractual obligations of con-
tinued service.? As the practice of special legislative grants of char-
ters and franchises was superseded by general acts of incorporation,
state regulation of railroad abandonments was also placed in the ex-
ercise of police powers over natural monopolies.36 And from 1920 on,
federal power to regulate interstate commerce has been used to limit
the abandonment of railroads in interstate commerce, under § 1(18)
of the Interstate Commerce Act. 7
Third, though one must administer legal realism warily, it should
be noted that the railroads in the 'right of retrieval' case law were
relatively small logging roads whose situation was staggeringly dis-
similar to Penn Central's position in the Northeastern economy.'
As an alternative, the state court might have reasoned that the railroad, though un-
profitable, operated under a statute allowing the railroad commission to require service
at a loss for some reasonable period of time. The Louisiana Railroad Commission was
empowered under the state constitution to "regulate . . . tariffs and service .... ",
LA. CONST. art. 284 (1913), readopting id. (1898), and this provision had been held suf-
ficient to allow the Commission to prohibit the abandonment of track. Railroad Comm'n
v. Kansas City S. Ry., 111 La. 133, 138, 35 So. 487, 489 (1903). But the Supreme Court
could then have replied that authority to restrict abandonment had to be delegated
expressly.
34. Apart from statute or express contract people who have put their money into
a railroad are not bound to go on with it at a loss if there is no reasonable prospect
of profitable operation in the future....
- - - Without previous statute or contract to compel the company to keep on at
a loss would be an unconstitutional taking of its property.
Bullock v. Florida ex rel. Railroad Comm'n, 254 U.S. 513, 520-21 (1921) (emphasis added).
35. See the typical reasoning of the state court in Gates v. Boston & N.Y.A.L.R.R.,
53 Conn. 333, 5 A. 695 (1885), appeal dismissed, 122 U.S. 646 (1887), a case in which
counsel Simeon E. Baldwin defended the right of the state to provide for reorganization
of a railroad over the protest of individual bondholders.
It is true that the charter is permissive in its terms, and probably no obligation
rests upon the corporation to construct the railroad . . . [But] by so accepting
and acting upon the chartered powers a contract exists to carry into full effect
the objects of the charter, and the capital stock, franchises and property of the
corporation stand charged primarily with this trust. . . Having exercised those
powers the corporation has no right against the will of the state to abandon the
enterprise, tear up its track, and sell its rolling-stock and other property, and di-
vide the proceeds among the stockholders.
53 Conn. at 342-43, 5 A. at 699. See C. CHERINGTON, THE REGULATION OF RAILROAD ABAN-
DONMENTS 18-20 (1948); Field, The Withdrawal from Service of Public Utility Companies,
35 YALE L.J. 169, 172 (1925).
36. See, e.g., C. CHERINGTON, supra note 35, at 22 & n.22, 24 & n.27; Field, supra note
35, at 170 nA.
37. See note 74 infra.
38. It may be that how far noncompensable regulation can properly diminish the
value of property should depend on the seriousness of the public problem-be it
nuisance or economic disruption-which the regulation is seeking to avoid. In an abanl-
donment of the mammoth Penn Central rail network, the economic loss caused to railroad
users and the economy would be disproportionately larger (compared to the loss to bond-
holders and stockholders from continued operation) than in the liquidation of a small
railroad which has few linkages with other parts of the economy.
Professor Michelman is generally critical of this type of "balancing" to determine the
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The Brooks-Scanlon railroad was "primarily a logging road" doing a
"small business as a common carrier" and had actually shut down and
sold off all its rolling stock two years before the case reached the
Supreme Court.3 9 Eastern Texas involved a 30-mile logging road
running through a "sparsely populated" area, and serving a lumber
industry that had long since "exhausted the adjacent supply of tim-
ber" and closed down.40 The road had run unprofitably for seven
years by the time the Supreme Court heard the case, and its with-
drawal from interstate and foreign commerce already had been ap-
proved by the Interstate Commerce Commission.4' Bullock also in-
volved a logging road.42
In addition, one might approach the two Holmes opinions, Brooks-
Scanlon and Bullock, with the cautioned view suggested by the late
Professor Bickel in his discussion of Brandeis's role in forming the
Bullock opinion. Holmes's broad declarations of the rights of property
sometimes concealed conditions and left premises unstated. 43
III. Preserving the Value of Creditors' Liens
The second line of case law which bears on the entitlement of
creditors and stockholders is that upholding the constitutionality of
limits of noncompensable regulation. Michelman, Property, Utility, and Fairness: Coln-
inents on the Ethical Foundations of "Just Compensation" Law, 80 HARV. L. REv. 1165,
1194-96 (1967). But in the case of interstate railroads, Michelman's emphasis on the
importance of expectations (id. at 1239, 1240) lends balancing a greater legitimacy, for
the federal statute constraining railroad abandonments itself explicitly uses a balancing
between losses to the railroad and losses to rail users. See p. 392 infra. See also
Michelman, supra at 1191 n.53, 1234-35.
39. 251 U.S. at 398. A court may understandably be more 'amenable to prohibiting
abandonment than requiring reassemblage of rail operations, especially for an admit-
tedly experimental period of operations. See Field, supra note 35, at 185 (in period
before state commission regulation, specific performance considered an improper form
of relief where utility had already dismantled plant).
40. 264 U.S. at 83.
41. Texas v. Eastern Tex. R.R., 258 U.S. 204, 214, 215 (1922).
42. 254 U.S. at 519.
43. Not infrequently Holmes' "forms of words," as be liked to call them, seemed
more sweeping than he really intended them to be, or than-refusing to descend
from the eminence of subtle silent premises and reservations on which he was
poised-lie could be made to see that they would seem.
A. BICKEL, THE UNPUBLISHED OPINIONS OF MR. JUSTICE BRANDEIS 226 (1957). Justices
Brandeis and John Clarke apparently took a skeptical view of the Bullock opinion. As
Bickel notes, Brandeis took the view
that a constitutional right to discontinue operations could not be given effect as a
general proposition, because its existence had to depend on varying particular cir-
cumstances, of which the state should be the judge.
Id. at 231. Clarke signed the Bullock opinion, but was disturbed by its unyielding tone:
"I fear . . . that, in its present form, [the opinion] may be seized upon as a jus-
tification for taking up temporarily unprofitable branch lines to the great incon-
venience and loss of many communities."
Id. at 236, citing Holmes Papers, Library of Harvard Law School.
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traditional § 77 rail reorganizations. There are striking statements in
these cases that the reorganization practices complained of were jus-
tifiable because they affected only the remedial rights of creditors
and did not alter the value of their liens.44
But there also has been continuing acceptance by the Court of
suspensions of mere "remedy" which may result in real financial loss.
The Court has acknowledged that during suspension of foreclosure
rights the value of the collateral sometimes will decline.4 5 Long de-
lays are often incurred in attempting to work out reorganization
plans under § 77,46 and on at least one occasion this has placed a
heavy burden on the estate of a railroad: in the New Haven bank-
ruptcy, the Supreme Court approved the imposition on New Haven
bondholders of more than six years of erosion loss as part of the rail-
road's reorganization and inclusion within the merged Penn Central
44. In Continental Ill. Nat'l Bank & Trust Co. v. Chicago, R.I. & Pac. Ry., 294 U.S. 648
(1935), the first major Supreme Court decision concerning § 77, the reorganization court
had issued an injunction against the sale of mortgage bonds pledged as collateral for cer-
tain notes. The Court upheld the injunction on grounds that release of the bonds would
have made impossible the formulation of a reorganization plan. Id. at 678. As assurance
that the seniors were not denied due process by the suspension of their contractual right
of sale as pledgee, the Supreme Court noted: "The injunction here goes no further than
to delay the enforcement of the contract. It affects only the remedy." Id. at 681. In
Reconstruction Fin. Corp. v. Denver & R.G.W.R.R., 328 U.S. 495 (1946), the Court upheld
the confirmation of a reorganization plan over the objection of the junior general
mortgage bondholders, with language that also distinguishes between impairment and
suspension of a lien:
[The bankruptcy powers of Congress] are adequate to require creditors to acquiesce
in a fair adjustment of their claims, so long as the creditor gets all the value of
his lien and his share of any free assets.
hd. at 533 (footnote omitted) (emphasis added), cited in Regional Rail Reorganization
Act Cases, 419 U.S. 102, 153, 154-55 (1974).
45. Continental Il. Nat'l Bank & Trust Co. v. Chicago, R.I. & Pac. Ry., 294 U.S. 618,
677 (1935). See New Haven Inclusion Cases, 399 U.S. 392, 490-93 (1970).
46. The reorganization of the Western Pacific Railroad took 71/ )ears (§ 77 peti-
tion filed August 2, 1935; plan certified by the ICC September 28, 1939, with an ef-
fective date of January 1, 1939; confirmed by district court August 15, 1940; upheld
by Supreme Court March 15, 1943). Ecker v. Western Pac. R.R., 318 U.S. 448, 453, 509
(1943); In re Western Pac. R.R., 34 F. Supp. 493, 506 (N.D. Cal. 1940). The reorganization
of the Denver Rio Grande Railroad lasted 10 years (§ 77 petition filed No~ember
1, 1935; final plan certified by the ICC June 14, 1943, with an effective date of January
1, 1943; plan confirmed by district court November 29, 19-14; upheld by Supreme Court
June 10, 1946). Reconstruction Fin. Corp. v. Denver & R.G.W.R.R., 328 U.S. 495, 500-01,
521 (1946). The Chicago, Rock Island & Pacific Railway reorganization lasted 15 years
(§ 77 petition filed June 7, 1933; plan certified by the ICC May 1, 1944; plan confirmed
for the final time by the district court June 26, 1947; plan upheld by court of
appeals June 2, 1948). In re Chicago, R.I. & Pac. Ry., 168 F.2d 587, 589, 592 (7th Cir.),
cert. denied sub noain. Texas v. Brown, 335 U.S. 855 (1948). See Kalmbach, The Re-
dedication of Lightly Used or Abandoned Rail Rights of Way to Other Uses, 7 TR'-Nsx'.
L.J. 99, 128 (1975) (Missouri Pacific reorganization lasted 23 years; Florida East Coast,
20 years; St. Louis-San Francisco, 14 years).
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system. Between $60 and $70 million was lost from the pre-bank-
ruptcy liquidation value of the New Haven's assets. 47
In addition, the securities paid to secured creditors in § 77 reor-
ganizations frequently have been assigned a value higher than any ever
attained in the market. Though senior creditors are in theory com-
pensated for the liquidation value of their liens, some fare less well
47. New Haven Inclusion Cases, 399 U.S. 392, 490-93 & n.82 (1970). The New Haven
reorganization began on July 7, 1961, and has lasted until the present time. For a
useful summary of the proceedings until early 1973, see In re New York, N.H. & H.R.R.,
479 F.2d 8, 9-13 (2d Cir. 1973). The original expectation was that transfer of the New
Haven's assets to the merged Penn Central system would effectively conclude the
New Haven's reorganization. But the bankruptcy of the Penn Central in 1970, only 2/2
years after the approval of its merger, and the collapse in value of the Penn Central
stock received by the New Haven as compensation, effectively tied the fate of the New
Haven creditors to the Penn Central reorganization.
The price to be paid by Penn Central to New Haven bondholders was the liquidation
value of the New Haven's properties as of December 31, 1966. New Haven Inclusion
Cases, 399 U.S. 392, 489 (1970). Thus, the burden of five years' erosion was placed on
the bondholders. In addition, losses from continued deficit operations between 1967
and the effective date of the Penn Central merger, January 15, 1968, were borne solely
by the New Haven's bondholders, id. at 493, as well as one-third of the operating losses
from the date of the merger until actual inclusion of the New Haven in the merged
system 11 months later. Id. at 479. The Court held the burden was constitutional, for
the bondholders had
"invested their capital in a public utility that does owe an obligation to the
public. . . . [B]y their entry into a railroad enterprise, [they] assumed the risk
that in any depression or any reorganization the interests of the public would be
considered as well as theirs."
Id. at 491-92, quoting Reconstruction Fin. Corp. v. Denver & R.G.W.R.R., 328 U.S. 495,
535-36 (1946). The erosion may have been as much as 28 percent of the pre-bankruptcy
value of the New Haven's estate. See Note, supra note 10, at 1007 n.19.
Most of this erosion was incurred when it was already apparent that an independent
income.based reorganization of the New Haven was impossible. See In re New York,
N.H. & H.R.R., 479 F.2d 8, 10 (2d Cir. 1973) ("Since the previous decade had demon-
strated convincingly that the New Haven's traffic patterns could not generate sufficient
revenues to meet its costs, no serious consideration was ever given to a reorganization
plan that left the New Haven as an independent operating enterprise.") Thus, the
erosion suffered by the railroads pending inclusion in Conrail is not disallowable merely
because independent reorganization of those railroads has been impossible.
The 1966 liquidation value was paid in accord with the "fair and equitable" standard
of § 77. See 399 U.S. at 489-90. The Court expressly declined to decide whether payment
by Penn Central to the New Haven of an amount lower than the 1966 liquidation
value would have constituted a taking. Id. at 490. However, the Court did approve the
reorganization court's vigorous rejection of an ICC proposal to reduce by another S28
million the compensation paid by Penn Central to New Haven's creditors. Id. at 451-
76. Though the rebuff of the ICC was based on nonconstitutional grounds, it might
suggest that the Court would have found any lesser amount to be a taking. Still, the
Court's approval of placing large post-1966 losses on the estate of New Haven, suh-
ordinating bondholders' claims even further, suggests that the 1966 liquidation value
could be a constitutional minimum only in some limited sense-perhaps the minimum
payable by an acquiring railroad for assets, which proceeds can be further invaded
because of the payee's service obligation.
For the suggestion that the operating erosion was approaching its constitutional limit.
see In re New York, N.H. & H.R.R., 289 F. Supp. 451, 459 (D. Conn. 1968) (continued
erosion of New Haven's estate from operating losses beyond the end of 1968 would
constitute a taking).
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than they would have in an immediate liquidation.45 Junior creditors
may be better off as a result, but that does not change the character
of the invasion of the seniors' security, if it is indeed an anticipatable4
invasion of liquidation value which gives rise to a taking. Though
the Special Court's estimate of the going-concern value of Conrail
securities could be subject to the same disparity, the federal guaran-
tee of the value of Conrail Series B preferred and common stock
will eliminate much of the risk of overestimation.50
48. This is, of course, the basis for perennial conflict between the seniors and juniors
of a business. If going-concern value appears greater than liquidation value, seniors
will be asked to forego the immediate cash satisfaction of their matured claims in faxor
of continuing the business to allow juniors a chance of compensation. The full com-
pensation for seniors required under absolute priority is rarely met because priorities
are observed with securities whose face value, rather than market .alue, equals the
full amount of the claim. The securities received by seniors generally do not sell at
their assigned value immediately, and frequently never do. See V. BRUDNEY &' M. CHIREL-
STEIN, CASES AND MATERIALS ON CORPORATE FINANCE 138-48 (1972); Brudney, The Invest-
ment-Value Doctrine and Corporate Readjustments, 72 HARV. L. REv. 645, 673-75 (1959);
Friendly & Tondel, The Relative Treatment of Securities in Railroad Reorganization
Under Section 77, 7 LAW 9- CONTEMP. PROB. 420, 423-24 (1940). If the securities assigned
to seniors in the new company are of a subordinate rank assigned as well to the former
juniors, then seniors must be awarded some additional value to make up for the loss
of priority. Consolidated Rock Prods. Co. v. Du Bois, 312 U.S. 510, 529 (1941). But this
bonus is frequently insufficient to give the old seniors the full value of their matured
claims if the earnings of the reorganized company are not as high as expected.
49. [To the extent that reorganization plans approved by administrative agen-
cies and courts over a period of years embody almost consistent overestimate of
the expected value of the payout, and therefore almost consistent underpayment
of the claim, the question may fairly be asked whether such an approach to the
determination of the expected value of the package of new securities reflects
actual disagreement as to the target.
V. BRUDNEY 9- M. CHRELSrEIN, supra note 48, at 144-45 (emphasis added). See Brudney,
supra note 48, at 673 (overvaluation by the ICC has been "not entirely accidental").
50. The redemption value of the guarantee certificates will increase from S450 mil-
lion at the end of 1976 to SI,050 million in 1987. I FINAL SYSTLM PLAN, supra note 10,
at 135. At the end of the 11 year period the guarantees will be sufficient to coier
almost half of the net liquidation value of all the operating properties of the insolvent
carriers, even according to the railroads' own estimates of net liquidation value. If one
takes USRA's lower :534 million estimate of the net liquidation value of properties
designated for transfer to Conrail, the guarantees will be sufficient to cover the -.alue
within three years. The usual standard for valuing securities in a § 77 reorganization
does not require that they have an immediate market value equivalent to their as-
signed value. Rather the securities need only have a "reasonable prospect" of selling
at that value. See Missouri Pac. R.R., 290 I.C.C. 477, 555 (1954), plan approved, 129 F.
Supp. 392 (E.D. Mo.), aff'd sub nom. Missouri Pac. R.R. v. Thompson, 225 F.2d 761
(8th Cir. 1955), cert. denied, 350 U.S. 959 (1956).
Even if one adheres to the strict requirement, described in note 22 supra, that any
reorganization minimum below liquidation value be satisfied with earnings-based values,
the federal guarantees can properly be used to argue that the constitutional minimum
in Conrail should be lower than the estimated going-concern %alues of previous re-
organizations. The "risk" in previous reorganizations was of two kinds: (a) antici-
pated risk, reflected in the estimated range of earnings and thus in the estimate of
going-concern value; and (b) unanticipated risk, that is, risk omitted from the estimate
of the possible range of earnings. It is the latter which must account for the unusually
frequent failure to realize projected going-concern values in § 77 reorganizations. Insofar
as this underestimation of risk was deliberate, one expects the candor of the Special
Court to provide a safeguard against recurrence. Only insofar as previous underestimation
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Finally, the "substantive value" of a creditor's lien or of a stock-
holder's equity has meaning only with reference to any independent
rules which govern the use of the underlying property. As will be
seen,G1 there is such a rule operative in railroad mortgages-the statu-
tory regulation of railroad abandonments which has empowered the
ICC to prohibit any complete cessation of rail service or dismantling
of rail lines until it is shown that the service is unavoidably un-
profitable system-wide. This obligation-in a sense a covenant which
runs with the railroad property-sharply distinguishes the reorganiza-
tion of a rail carrier from the reorganization of a business not subject
to regulation as a public utility. A farmer is free at any time to
lay down his tools and sell his farm. The substantive value of a lien
on his property has direct reference to the liquidation value of the
farm. 52 In contrast, the creditors of an insolvent railroad company
are constrained by the same restrictions on abandonment of service
which obligated the debtor railroad itself.
IV. Liquidation Value and § 77
The claim of a right to liquidation value in railroad reorganization
may derive its greatest plausibility from the parallel' history of the
older reorganization statute governing all railroads in interstate com-
merce, § 77, and the reorganization statute governing industrial cor-
porations, Chapter X,53 originally § 77B.54 The temptation is to view
interstate railroad reorganization as simply another bankruptcy pro-
cedure, enacted to serve the best economic interests of junior creditors
and stockholders by allowing the realization of going-concern value
otherwise lost in the dismantling of an insolvent business. But § 77-
though a statute using the bankruptcy power to extinguish valueless
debt obligations-may also be viewed as an exercise of interstate com-
merce power over railroad operations.
A. The Interstate Commerce Commission as a
Party to Bankruptcy Reorganization
The intertwining of the commerce and bankruptcy powers in the
regulation of railroads can be seen, in a very mechanical way, in the
was unavoidable does the federal guarantee provide an extra benefit to creditors and
stockholders participating in Conrail. But by definition, in reaching an estimate of
Conrail's going-concern value for comparison with an earnings-based minimum, the
Special Court can only take anticipatable risk into account; thus the federal guarantees
would not affect the outcome of the test.
51. See pp. 391-94 infra.
52. See Louisville Joint Stock Land Bank v. Radford, 295 U.S. 555 (1935).
53. II U.S.C. §§ 501-676 (1970).
54. See 11 U.S.C. § 207 (1970).
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structure of previous reorganization machinery. Since 1920, a rail cor-
poration has needed ICC approval in order to issue securities,5 so
that even under equity receiverships the Interstate Commerce Com-
mission assumed a role in structuring reorganized companies. 5 Under
§ 77, the ICC has had sole authority to certify a plan of reorganiza-
tion to the supervising court; the plan may be different from any
preferred by the private parties involved.57 The reorganization court
can reject but cannot amend the plan and thus is left only with the
possibility of a remand to the ICC.5s In a Chapter X reorganization,
the Securities and Exchange Commission plays a much weaker role.
Only if the company's debts exceed $3 million must the reorganization
court submit a plan of reorganization to the SEC for comment."9 And
even then the SEC's views are merely advisory; the court can accept
a plan prepared by one of the private parties whether or not the SEC
approves the plan.20
Under § 77, it is also the ICC that takes major responsibility for
valuing the debtor, deciding what sort of securities structure the earn-
ings can sustain. 6' Judicial review of the ICC estimate traditionally
has been limited.0 2 In Chapter X, valuation is instead the responsi-
bility of the reorganization trustee.04
B. "Earning Power" and Section 77
"Earning power" is mandated by § 77 as the primary criterion for
valuation." There is no procedure requiring a comparison of the
55. 49 U.S.C. § 20a(2) (1970) (enacted by the Transportation Act of Feb. 28, 1920,
ch. 91, § 439, 41 Stat. 494-95).
56. However, this ICC supervision was not terribly effective, as "[the Commission's
control was brought to bear so late in the proceedings that it usually gave its reluctant
approval to unsound capital structures in order to avoid the costs of prolonged re-
ceivership." Fuller, supra note 3, at 384.
57. Bankruptcy Act § 77(d), 11 U.S.C. § 205(d) (1970). The independent trustee chosen
by the reorganization court to continue running the business and to take primary re-
sponsibility for an initial plan of reorganization can be appointed only with ICC
approval. Id. § 77(c)(1), 11 U.S.C. § 205(c)(1) (1970). Under Chapter X, the SEC take,
no part in the appointment of the trustee. See 11 U.S.C. § 556 (1970).
58. Bankruptcy Act § 77(e), 11 U.S.C. § 205(e) (1970).
59. 11 U.S.C. § 572 (1970); R. JENNINGS & H. MARSH, SECURITIES REGULATION 49 (1972).
60. 11 U.S.C. § 572 (1970).
61. Bankruptcy Act § 77(e), 11 U.S.C. § 205(e) (1970) ("If it shall be necessary to
determine the value of any property for any purpose under this section [providing for
acceptance of a reorganization plan by creditors and stockholders and confirmation of
a plan by the court], the Commission shall determine such value and certify the same
to the court in its report on the plan.")
62. Ecker v. Western Pac. R.R., 318 U.S. 448, 472, 474, 512 (1943). But see New Haven
Inclusion Cases, 399 U.S. 392, 433-34 (1970).
63. 11 U.S.C. § 567(5) (1970).
64. Bankruptcy Act § 77(c), I1 U.S.C. § 205(c) (1970); Group of Institutional Investors
v. Chicago, M. St. P. & Pac. R.R., 318 U.S. 523, 539-41 (1943).
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-liquidation value and going-concern value of the rail assets. The
ICC's failure to make an explicit comparisonG5 raises the suspicion
that at times liquidation value may have been higher. In the leading
Supreme Court cases sustaining § 77 reorganization plans and pro-
cedures,'3 there has been no stated assumption that going-concern
value exceeded liquidation value.
One may be tempted to object that § 77 proceedings would only
have been started when it was clear that going-concern value would
probably exceed liquidation value. But in practice the initiation of
reorganization proceedings would have been almost inevitable. Initia-
tion of § 77 is available either by petition of the debtor or by petition
of creditors with five percent or more of the aggregate indebtedness. 67
Unless the liquidation value of an insolvent railroad was so high as
to leave significant value for stockholders, it would be to their advan-
tage to petition for reorganization in the hope that during the possibly
lengthy proceedings, earnings prospects would improve sufficiently to
leave them some participation in the new company.68 Once a § 77
proceeding is initiated, it cannot be unilaterally terminated by the
debtor or creditors. Though any plan approved by the ICC is sub-
mitted to the creditors and stockholders for a two-thirds vote by class,69
65. See King, Feasibility in Chapter X Reorganizations, 49 Am. BANKR. L.J. 323, 337
n.47 (1975):
The SEC and the ICC appear to have different valuation approaches . ... In
Chapter X, the SEC estimates the future earnings and life expectancy of the enter-
prise as a whole, determines the appropriate capitalization rate, and then computes
the value of the reorganized firm. The ICC, in section 77 proceedings, also starts with
an estimate of the enterprise's total expected earnings, always taking the stream
of earnings in perpetuity, but does not explicitly choose a single capitalization rate,
nor does it reveal a final figure for reorganization value. The ICC only calculates
"how large a capitalization can be supported by the predicted earnings."
66. Reconstruction Fin. Corp. v. Denver & R.G.W.R.R., 328 U.S. 495 (1946); Group
of Institutional Investors v. Chicago, M. St. P. & Pac. R.R., 318 U.S. 523 (1943); Ecker
v. Western Pac. R.R., 318 U.S. 448 (1943); Continental Ill. Nat'l Bank & Trust Co. v.
Chicago, R.I. & Pac. Ry., 294 U.S. 648 (1935).
67. Bankruptcy Act § 77(a), 11 U.S.C. § 205(a) (1970).
68. See IV. BLUM & S. KAPLAN, MATERIALS ON REORGANIZATION, RECAPITALIlZATION
AND INSOLVENCY 533-34 (1969).
69. Bankruptcy Act § 77(e), 11 U.S.C. § 205(e) (1970). If the claims of a class of
creditors or stockholders have "no value," the class need not be permitted to vote. Id.
For voting purposes, the value of a class's interest is apparently determined according
to whether there is room for its participation in the reorganization plan of the debtor.
See Ecker v. Western Pac. R.R., 318 U.S. 448, 479 (1943) ("[T]he requirement of [judicial]
affirmation of the exclusion of claimants [from voting] does not require an independent
appraisal of the valuation which ordained their elimination. The court properly af-
firms the Commission, when it finds no legal objection to the Commission's use of its
own valuation to determine whether particular claimants are entitled to participate
in the reorganization.") If a reorganization plan were formulated and approved by the
ICC in circumstances where going-concern value happened to be less than liquidation
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the plan can be confirmed over any voting class's opposition under the
"cramdown" power 0 so long as the judge finds the plan to be "fair
and equitable." 71
The plausibility of the claim that going-concern value always has
been greater than liquidation value in § 77 proceedings is further
undercut by the limited statutory alternatives hitherto available to
an insolvent railroad. Railroads were excluded from all federal bank-
ruptcy legislation until the passage of § 77 because of the assumption
that straight bankruptcy-aimed only at liquidation of assets with dis-
tribution of their proceeds to creditors and discharge of the debtor-
was unsuitable for railroads obligated to continue service. Section
77 is strictly a reorganization statute, to rehabilitate the financial struc-
ture of the debtor." Even now there is no provision allowing a rail-
road to enter straight bankruptcy. 73 The only course open to an in-
solvent interstate railroad that preferred to liquidate rather than re-
organize would have been to enter an equity receivership and peti-
tion the ICC for permission to abandon service.
value, it thus appears that the junior classes most severely prejudiced by the reorganization
would not be entitled to take part in one of the main devices provided under the
Bankruptcy Act for signaling disagreement.
70. Bankruptcy Act § 77(e), I1 U.S.C. § 205(e) (1970). See note 21 supra.
71. Bankruptcy Act § 77(e), 11 U.S.C. § 205(e) (1970). The "fair and equitable" standard
has been used in § 77 as a term of art embodying the absolute priority rule, determining
the order of creditors' claims. See Ecker v. Western Pac. R.R., 318 U.S. 448, 513 (1943)
(Roberts, J., concurring); Case v. Los Angeles Lumber Prods. Co., 308 U.S. 106, 118 (1939).
In the purchase of the New Haven's assets by the Penn Central system, "fair and equita-
ble" was also the standard used in requiring pa)ment by Penn Central of the 1966 liqui-
dation value of the assets. See note 47 supra. But this approach to valuation was accepted
where the railroad had "neither earning power nor the prospect of earning power."
New Haven Inclusion Cases, 399 U.S. 392, 436 (1970).
72. As Justice Sutherland observed:
Section 77 advances another step in the direction of liberalizing the law on
the subject of bankruptcies. Railway corporations had been definitely excluded
from the operation of the [bankruptcy] law in 1910 (c. 412, § 4, 36 Stat. 838, 839),
probably because such corporations could not be liquidated in the ordinary way or
by a distribution of assets. A railway is a unit; it can not be divided up and dis-
posed of piecemeal like a stock of goods. It must be sold, if sold at all, as a
unit and as a going concern. Its activities can not be halted because its continuous,
uninterrupted operation is necessary in the public interest; and, for the preserva-
tion of that [public] interest, as well as for the protection of the various private
interests involved, reorganization was evidently regarded as the most feasible so-
lution whenever the corporation had become "insolvent or unable to meet its debts
as they mature."
Continental Ill. Nat'l Bank & Trust Co. v. Chicago, R.I. & Pac. Ry., 294 U.S. 648, 671-72
(1935).
[A] proceeding under § 77 is not an ordinary proceeding in bankruptcy. It is a
special proceeding which seeks only to bring about a reorganization, if a satisfactory
plan to that end can be devised.
Id. at 676 (emphasis added).
73. See 11 U.S.C. § 22 (1970) (excluding railroad, insurance, banking, and municipal
corporations and building and loan associations from eligibility as bankrupts).
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V. Abandonment Regulation, Ratemaking, and Confiscation
The statute that imposes the requirement of continued service on
railroads in interstate commerce is § 1(18) of the Interstate Commerce
Act:
[N]o carrier by railroad subject to this chapter shall abandon all
or any portion of a line of railroad, or the operation thereof,
unless and until there shall first have been obtained from the
Commission a certificate that the present or future public con-
venience and necessity permit of such abandonment. 74
An abandonment for which permission has not been obtained can
be enjoined, and subjects the person who directed the abandonment
to criminal penalties.75
By the terms of the Act, the permission of the ICC must be obtained
for any abandonment, whether a railroad wishes to cease operations
on one branch only,76 or to shut down its entire system. 77 Thus, the
74. 49 U.S.C. § 1(18) (1970) (enacted by the Transportation Act of Feb. 28, 1920, ch.
91, § 402, 41 Stat. 477-78). Interestingly, § 1(18) is quite similar in wording to the
state statute in Eastern Texas which the Court felt compelled to confine to other rail-
roads in order to find a constitutional right to abandon the Eastern Texas Railroad.
"[N]or shall the main track of any railroad once constructed and operated be abandoned
or removed." Act of Mar. 29, 1889, ch. 24, § 1, [1889] Gen. Laws of the State of Texas
20. The Eastern Texas Court held that the scope of this statute was confined to railroads
sold under judicial decree. Railroad Comm'n v. Eastern Tex. R.R., 264 U.S. 79, 88-89
(1924).
The ICC is given discretion over the issuance of abandonment certificates by § 1(20):
The Commission shall have power to issue such certificates as prayed for, or
to refuse to issue it, or to issue it for a portion or portions of a line of railroad,
or extension thereof, described in the application, or for the partial exercise only of
such right or privilege, and may attach to the issuance of the certificate such terms
and conditions as in its judgment the public convenience and necessity may require.
419 U.S.C. § 1(20) (1970). On ICC abandonment regulation, see generally C. CHERINGTON,
supra note 35, at 80-98, 119-88; M. CONANT, RAILROAD MERGERS AND ABANDONMENTS 118-31
(1964); W. JoNEs, CASES AND MATERIALS ON REGULATED INDUsTRIEs 388-93 (1967); Kalmbach,
supra note 46, at 121-26; Weissman, Railroad Abandonments: The Competitive Ideal, 43
MINN. L. REv. 251 (1958); Weissman, Railroad Abandonments: The Impact of Compe-
tition, 44 Iow. L. Rzv. 492 (1959).
75. 49 U.S.C. § 1(20) (1970).
76. See, e.g., Northwestern Pac. R.R. v. United States, 228 F. Supp. 690 (N.D. Cal.) (per
curiam), aff'd per curian sub noin. Northwestern Pac. R.R. v. ICC, 379 U.S. 132 (1964)
(sustaining ICC's denial of permission to abandon 2.5 mile portion of track); Purcell
v. United States, 41 F. Supp. 309 (D. Md. 1941), aff'd, 315 U.S. 381 (1942) (sustaining
ICC order permitting Baltimore & Ohio Railroad Company to abandon 19.8 miles of
track, parts of which were to be flooded by federal reservoir).
77. See, e.g., Meyers v. Jay St. Connecting R.R., 259 F.2d 532, 535 (2d Cir. 1958)
(sustaining injunction against "total abandonment" by Jay Street Railroad because ICC
permission had not been obtained); City of New York v. United States, 344 F. Supp.
929 (E.D.N.Y. 1972) (three-judge court) (sustaining ICC order permitting abandonment
of the entire operation of Bush Terminal Railroad Company); Illinois v. United States,
213 F. Supp. 83 (N.D. Ill. 1962), a 'd per curian, 373 U.S. 378 (1963) (sustaining ICC
order permitting Chicago, North Shore & Milwaukee Railroad to abandon entire system);
Missouri & Ark. Ry., 271 I.C.C. 171 (1948) (approving abandonment of entire 330 mile
operation).
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service obligations imposed by the Interstate Commerce Act are not
simply a condition which must be fulfilled by a railroad that wishes
to continue operations on some part of its lines; rather they enforce
a dedication of indefinite duration on any capital committed to a
railroad system.78 The abandonment provisions continue to apply even
when a railroad is in § 77 reorganization.T
The statutory criterion for abandonment is that it be consistent
with "public necessity and convenience."80 The test is also formulated
as whether the burden on interstate commerce8 l imposed by uneco-
nomical rail operations is "undue": that is, whether the financial bur-
den on the carrier imposed by continuing services is outweighed by
the hardship which abandonment would work on local communities,
businesses, shippers, and passengers dependent on rail service. If little
or no public inconvenience would result, the ICC is free to allow
an abandonment even where the carrier could readily absorb the fi-
nancial burden of continued operation. 2
However, if abandonment of all or part of a railroad's operation
would lead to serious hardship, the ICC may treat the abandonment
request far more stringently. The railroad, first of all, has the evi-
dentiary burden of proving the losses which continued service would
cause.8 3 Abandonment can be denied or delayed to permit an experi-
78. "A part of the capital dedicated to a railroad enterprise cannot witldraw itself
without authorization any more than all of the capital can withdraw itself and abandon
the railroad without approval." Schwabacher v. United States, 334 U.S. 182, 201 (1948)
(minority preferred stockholders of a railroad cannot redeem their stock at par plus
accrued unpaid dividends in a merger approved under § 5 of the Interstate Commerce
Act, 49 U.S.C. § 5 (1970), despite provision of corporate charter guaranteeing redemption
in the event of a "winding-up").
79. Bankruptcy Act § 77(o), 11 U.S.C. § 205(o) (1970).
80. See.Colorado v. United States, 271 U.S. 153, 168 (1926) (Brandeis, J.).
81. The abandonment provision was placed squarely within Congress's power to
regulate interstate commerce by the reasoning that running uneconomical or unneces-
sary lines would weaken a railroad's ability to function as an interstate carrier. See id.
at 162-63. In the regulation of total abandonment of operations by an interstate carrier,
the connection to interstate commerce can be demonstrated by showing that abandonment
would divert traffic to other carriers and thereby improve their ability to maintain
operations, or that the absence of sufficient revenue for maintenance would affect the
safety of interstate passengers. See Illinois v. United States, 213 F. Supp. 83, 90-91 n.,
(N.D. Ill. 1962).
82. See, e.g., Colorado v. United States, 271 U.S. 153, 168 (1926); Purcell v. United
States, 315 U.S. 381, 384-85 (1942) (sustaining ICC decision allowing abandonment of
line displaced by flood control project even though cost of relocation would be borne
by Government and line had not been operating at a loss); Nebraska ex rel. Nebraska Ry.
Comm'n v. United States, 255 F. Supp. 718, 723 (D. Neb. 1966). See also Southern Ry.
v. North Carolina, 376 U.S. 93 (1964).
83. See NVellsville, A. & G.R.R., 338 I.C.C. 604, 609 (1971); Pere Marquette Ry., 72
I.C.C. 303, 307 (1922) ("Where losses are claimed we cannot accept the carrier's con-
clusions as to such losses, but must have before us the items thereof in sufficient detail
to leave no reasonable doubt as to the justification for the carrier's claim.")
In the proposed abandonment of a single line that is part of a carrier system, proving
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mental period to test whether the losses are temporary or avoidables4
A railroad may be required to attempt to stem the losses by rene-
gotiating its division of fares with other carriers,8s by applying for
a change of rate schedule,-6 or by applying to local authorities for
tax relief87 and other governmental aid.s An abandonment applica-
tion can be denied if the ICC believes the market conditions leading
to losses were abnormal or are likely to change in the future.80
In the case of a railroad running at an unavoidable loss system-
wide, abandonment proceedings can involve a process curiously simi-
lar to the Rail Act's selection of limited properties for the new Conrail
losses attributable to that line can be a complicated and controversial matter. See, e.g.,
Wellsville A. & G.R.R., supra at 607 (rejecting application for abandonment of 50
percent of track because railroad failed to credit to the line any portion of revenues
derived from freight car leases or bridge traffic and charged against that line as much
as 75 percent of total maintenance expenses); Rood, Protecting the User Interest in
Railroad Rcorganization, 7 LAW & CONTEMP. PRon. 495, 503-04 (1940) (criticizing standards
applied in abandonment of the Old Colony rail lines during first New Haven reorgani-
zation, because no notice taken of the effect of deliberate diversion of traffic from Old
Colony to main New Haven routes).
84. See Colorado v. United States, 271 U.S. 153, 160 (1926) (abandonment initially
denied by ICC for a year with leave to renew "'if the improvement in operating re-
suits, confidently anticipated by protestants, should not materialize.' "); C. CHERINGTON,
supra note 35, at 126 ("On occasion the Commission has found that, although losses
are being incurred, the applicant has failed to discount the influence of temporary
factors, and has held that the abandonment should be postponed pending further de-
velopments.") (footnote omitted).
85. See, e.g., Brooklyn E. Dist. Terminal v. United States, 302 F. Supp. 1095, 1104
(E.D.N.Y. 1969); Wellsville A. & G.R.R., 338 I.C.C. 604, 608 (1971).
86. See Chicago N.S. & M. Ry., 312 I.C.C. 99, 102 (1960) (though entire North Shore
had sustained large operating losses for over 30 years, with exception of war years,
ICC deferred action on abandonment application for one year, during which North
Shore was to apply for rate increase and attempt to reduce operating expenses); Southern
Pac. Co., 333 I.C.C. 525, 550, 558 (1968) (carrier should seek additional fare increase to
reduce deficit on passenger train operation).
87. See, e.g., Colorado & S. Ry., 166 I.C.C. 470, 492 (1930) (application for aban-
donment of branch line denied, with possibility of renewal after three years, to test
prospects of traffic growth and to allow railroad to attempt to reduce expenses and
seek tax relief).
88. See Southern Pac. Co., 333 I.C.C. 525, 547 (1968) ("No attempts were made to
determine which governmental officials had authority and jurisdiction over meaningful
programs of public assistance and subsidies, or who would be in a position to originate
and propose necessary legislative action to implement such programs.")
89. See Wellsville A. & G.R.R., 338 I.C.C. 604, 608 (1971) ("testimony of shippers,
receivers of freight, and public witnesses" showed "definite possibilities of an increase
in the volume of business"); Missouri Pac. R.R., 307 I.C.C. 189, 199-200, 207 (1959) (ICC
rejected conclusion that branch line could not be operated profitably, because freight
traffic in farming area had been abnormally low from drought and temporary local
storage of grain); Pennsylvania, 0. & D.R.R., 236 I.C.C. 490, 497 (1939) (branch aban-
donment denied because operating loss was due to carrier's practice of handling branch
traffic "over a more circuitous route" and carrier's failure to maintain full service,
leading to loss of traffic). See also Southern Pac. Co., 333 I.C.C. 525, 558 (1968) (recent
patronage decline rejected as evidence of a "hopeless long-run outlook" for passenger
service because carrier had made "little effort to attract passengers" despite possible
substantial market; application for partial service cutback under 49 U.S.C. § 13a(l)
(1970) was refused).
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system. Where the carrier proposes complete abandonment despite
the fact that the amount of traffic varies on different lines or sections,
the ICC can refuse permission to abandon the portions with heaviest
traffic which might run profitably as a scaled-down system, and allow
abandonment of the rest.90
That an applicant for abandonment faces the burden of proving
future losses does not foretell how far below current liquidation value
erosion can constitutionally proceed; an abandonment hearing itself
might be subject to dismissal if delay seemed arbitrary. But if there
is genuine doubt about the inevitability of the losses supporting an
abandonment, or if profitable operation of some of the system seems
possible by paring away unprofitable lines, then part of the operating
losses incurred in testing those possibilities would probably be borne
by the railroad's estate. Liquidation value-which assumes no burden
can be placed on an applicant for abandonment-thus seems too high
to be the entitlement of Conrail railroads.
Where an abandonment-partial or total-is found to be inconsis-
tent with the public convenience and necessity, the statute on its face
allows the ICC to refuse a certificate of abandonment to the carrier
and to insist that the capital remain in its present use. But refusal of
abandonment, like any other regulatory practice, is limited by the
Fifth Amendment; one is thrown back to the question of what con-
stitutes confiscatory denial of abandonment. One source in judging
the entitlement of stockholders in an abandonment refusal is the stan-
dards governing ratemaking. If the action of a regulatory commission
in limiting a railroad's rate of return by setting a rate schedule is
nonconfiscatory, then so must be the limitation of rate of return by
denial of partial or total abandonment. Further, where a regulatory
commission engages in the activity of setting rates in an industry sub-
ject to requirements of continued service, the implicit premise of the
exercise must be that it is proper to require service under those
circumstances.
In ratemaking, there is no longer any ground for a regulated com-
90. 49 U.S.C. § 1(20) (1970) allows the ICC to choose to grant only part of a carrier's
request for abandonment: the Commission may issue a certificate of abandonment "for
a portion or portions of a line of railroad . . . described in the application, or for
the partial exercise only of such right or privilege .... '" See, e.g., Thornton & A. Ry.,
138 I.C.C. 416, 424 (1928) (application for complete abandonment accepted only in
part); Eastern Ky. Ry., 111 I.C.C. 476 (1926) (though railway had significant operating
deficits for six of previous 10 years, had never paid any dividends to stockholders,
and had required cash advances from stockholders to meet operating deficits, appli-
cation for complete abandonment was allowed only in part; more populated southern
portion of railway to be operated independently for a year to see whether it could
meet expenses); C. CHERINrToN, supra note 35, at 145.
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pany to contend that it has a constitutional right to an earnings stream
whose present value equals liquidation value as such. FPC v. Hope
Natural Gas Co.91 and FPC v. Natural Gas Pipeline Co. 2 established
that a rate base can be founded on any of a number of measures,",
and that a rate of return need not have a capitalized value equal to
reproduction value . 4 By the same logic, a rule requiring capitalized
earnings to equal liquidation value would have to be rejected, for
it too would tie regulated rates to a single inflexible formula.
Natural Gas Pipeline and Hope also established that actual his-
torical investment was an acceptable rate base.0 5 Historical cost has
subsequently become the basis most commonly used for rate calcu-
lations. 9 A rule requiring that capitalized earnings equal liquidation
value would inconsistently divorce rates from any relationship to his-
torical investment.0 7
91. 320 U.S. 591 (1944).
92. 315 U.S. 575 (1942).
93. In Natural Gas Pipeline the Court noted:
The Constitution does not bind rate-making bodies to the scrvice of any single
formula or combination of formulas. Agencies to whom this legislative power has
been delegated are free, within the ambit of their statutory authority, to make the
pragmatic adjustments which may be called for by particular circumstances.
FPC v. Natural Gas Pipeline Co., 315 U.S. 575, 586 (1942). See also FPC 1'. Hope Natural
Gas Co., 320 U.S. 591, 602 (1944) ("It is not theory but the impact of the rate order
which counts.")
94. The radical character of Hope and Natural Gas Pipeline was in overthrowing
the stringent "fair value" standard of early ratemaking. The effect was "to lay the
ghost of Smyth v. Ames [169 U.S. 466 (1898)]," as Justices Black, Douglas, and Murphy
put it. FPC v. Natural Gas Pipeline Co., 315 U.S. 575, 602 (1942) (concurring opinion).
The Smyth rule had required regulatory commissions to base a utility's rate of return
on a "'fair value" of the property which gave considerable weight to reproduction cost.
See id. at 604-05 (Black, Douglas & Murphy, JJ., concurring); Missouri ex rel. South-
western Bell Tel. Co. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 262 U.S. 276, 289-90 (1923) (Brandeis &
Holmes, JJ., dissenting).
The flexibility left to rate commissions by Natural Gas Pipeline and Hope seems
to forbid courts from requiring any single formula such as reproduction value. See
FPC v. Natural Gas Pipeline Co., supra at 606 (Black, Douglas, and Murphy, JJ., con-
curring) ("As we read the opinion of the Court, the Commission is now freed from the
compulsion of admitting evidence on reproduction cost or of giving any weight to
that element of 'fair value.' ); FPC v. Hope Natural Gas Co., 320 U.S. 591, 628 (1944)
(Jackson, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) ("Certainly the theory of the
court below that ties rate-making to the fair-value-reproduction-cost formula should be
overruled as in conflict with [Natural Gas Pipeline].") (footnote omitted).
95. FPC v. Natural Gas Pipeline Co., 315 U.S. 575, 606 (1942) ("The Commission
may now adopt, if it chooses, prudent investment as a rate base-the base long advocated
by Mr. Justice Brandeis. . . . [There could be no constitutional objection if the Com-
mission adhered to that formula and rejected all others."); FPC v. Hope Natural Gas
Co., 320 U.S. 591, 628 & n.2 (1944) (Jackson, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
96. See L. WVEiss, CASE STUDIES IN AMERICAN INDUSTRY 108-09 & n.12 (2d ed. 1971).
97. Use of either liquidation value or reproduction value as a rate base entails the
assumption that investors' entitlement in ratemaking extends to any increase in the
market value of property used in the regulated business. This assumption was criticized
harshly by Justices Brandeis and Holmes in their Southwestern Bell dissent, grandfather
of Hope and Natural Gas Pipeline:
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This rejection of liquidation value as a standard for stockholders'
entitlement in ratemaking is more than a question of mere labeling.
It is true, of course, that Hope and other cases stress the desirability
of maintaining the financial integrity of a regulated company-of
assuring a rate of return high enough to allow the business to attract
new equity needed for expansion or refinancing. But the Hope stan-
dard of attracting capital is in fact applicable only where the industry
is capable of earning a great deal and a regulatory commission is
holding down its earnings. A more flexible standard has applied where
an industry is doing badly for economic reasons, and where under any
rate schedule the rate of return would be low.99
The thing devoted by the investor to the public use is not specific property, tan-
gible and intangible, but capital embarked in the enterprise. . . . The several items
of property constituting the utility, taken singly, and freed from the public use,
may conceivably have an aggregate value greater than if the items are used in
combination. The owner is at liberty, in the absence of controlling statutory pro-
vision, to withdraw his property from the public service; and, if he does so, may
obtain for it exchange value. . . But so long as the specific items of property are
employed by the utility, their exchange value is not of legal significance.
262 U.S. at 290 (footnote omitted). Treating liquidation value as the standard would
introduce two peculiar kinds of arbitrariness into ratemaking: the constitutionally
minimum rate of return would depend on the level of inflation of the current value
of assets over their historical cost, and on the relative salvageability of the property.
Though two businesses might have the same historical investment, a more remunerative
rate schedule could be demanded by the business whose equipment had increased most
in value and was more easily removed and marketed.
98. FPC v. Hope Natural Gas Co., 320 U.S. 591, 605 (1944):
Rates which enable the company to operate successfully, to maintain its financial
integrity, to attract capital, and to compensate its investors for the risks assumed
certainly cannot be condemned as invalid, even though they might produce only
a meager return on the so-called "fair value" rate base.
See FPC v. Natural Gas Pipeline Co., 315 U.S. 575, 607 (1942) (Black, Douglas & Murphy,
JJ., concurring); Missouri ex rel. Southwestern Bell Tel. Co. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 262
U.S. 276, 291 (1923) (Brandeis & Holmes, JJ., dissenting); New England Tel. & Tel. Co.
v. Department of Pub. Util., 327 Mass. 81, 94, 97 N.E.2d 509, 516 (1951).
99. See FPC v. Hope Natural Gas Co., 320 U.S. 591, 603 (1944), quoting FPC v.
Natural Gas Pipeline Co., 315 U.S. 575, 590 (1942) ("'regulation does not insure that
the business shall produce net revenues' "). In Natural Gas Pipeline, the Court affirmed
the FPC's refusal to include the maintenance cost of excess capacity in the rate base
of a utility company brought under regulation for the first time, even though such an
exclusion would reduce the company's revenues. "[T]he hazard that the property will
not earn a profit remains on the company in the case of a regulated, as well as an
unregulated, business." FPC v. Natural Gas Pipeline, supra at 590.
The strongest statement of the defeasibility of the Hope standard of maintaining
credit and attracting capital occurred in Market St. Ry. v. Railroad Comm'n, 324 U.S.
548 (1945). In setting rates for a failing cable car system, the California Railroad Com-
mission refused the railway's request for a seven cent fare, instead setting the fare one
cent lower. In justifying this as yielding an adequate return, the Commission refused
to consider as a rate base either capitalization, historical cost, or reproduction value;
rather it chose the much lower price at which the railway had offered to sell its proper-
ties to the city of San Francisco. The Railroad Commission predicted a six percent
rate of return on the shrunken rate base; the rate of return earned upon the face value
of the securities would have been only 1.26 percent. The higher fare would have
increased the rate of return to 9.6 percent on the shrunken rate base, and 2.01 percent
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Indeed, one line of case law-the "net loss" cases-seems to rule out
a claim of confiscation by shareholders so long as a carrier is re-
turning any earnings on equity. In Baltimore & Ohio Railroad v.
United States,100 the Court upheld a noncompensatory freight rate for
certain fresh vegetables against a Fifth Amendment challenge by not-
ing that there was
no claim that the challenged rates will make any one of the com-
plaining railroads operate its entire business at a loss ....
... So long as a railroad is not caused by such regulations to
lose money on its over-all business, it is hard to think that it could
successfully charge that its property was being taken for public
use "without just compensation."'101
The "net loss" test for confiscation was also adopted in Northwest-
emn Pacific Railroad v. United States, °(2 a case which transposed the
standard from ratemaking to abandonment. The Northwestern chal-
lenged an ICC order denying its request to abandon a portion of rail-
road line, because maintaining service on the line required rebuilding
on the face value of the securities. The company could not possibly attract new equity
under such rates, but the Court declared that the Hope standard was inapposite.
[The] considerations, advanced in (Hope] (which was reviewed pursuant to statute
rather than under the Fourteenth Amendment), concerned a company which had
advantage of an economic position which promised to yield what was held to be an
excessive return on its investment and on its securities. They obviously are in-
applicable to a company whose financial integrity already is hopelessly undermined,
which could not attract capital on any possible rate, and where investors recognize
as lost a part of what they have put in. . . .There was no suggestion [in Hope]
that less might not be allowed when the amount allowed was all that the company
could earn.
Id. at 566. It should be noted that the $7.9 million figure used as a rate base in Market
Street Railway was not liquidation value in its conventional sense, that is, what the
property of the railway would have yielded if sold for scrap. Rather, it was the pre-
liminary negotiated price for sale of the operating railway to the city of San Francisco.
As part of that transaction, the railway was relieved of its obligation to continue
operations, return on which was likely to be low. (The railway had operated at an
intermittent deficit since at least 1938 and had already been denied permission to aban-
don several unprofitable lines. See Market St. Ry. v. Railroad Comm'n, 24 Cal.2d 378,
385, 386, 150 P.2d 196, 201 (1944).)
See also Reagan v. Farmers' Loan & Trust Co., 154 U.S. 362, 412 (1894); Democratic
Cent. Comm. v. Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Comm'n, 485 F.2d 886, 912
(D.C. Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 935 (1974).
100. 345 U.S. 146 (1953) (Black, J.).
101. Id. at 148 (footnote omitted). Justice Douglas and Chief Justice Vinson dis-
sented in Baltimore & Ohio, not on the ground that Justice Black's test for a con-
fiscatory rate of return was too harsh in allowing a very low return on invested
capital system-wide, but rather on the ground that any rate for a class of commodities
which did not cover costs was probably unreasonable and arbitrary.
For another ratemaking case where the "net loss" test for confiscation was adopted,
sce Pan Am. Airways, Inc. v. CAB, 256 F.2d 711 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 358 U.S.
836 (1958).
102. 228 F. Supp. 690 (N.D. Cal.) (three-judge court) (per curiam), af 'd per curiam
sub nom. Northwestern Pac. R.R. v. ICC, 379 U.S. 132 (1964).
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a collapsed railroad tunnel. The three-judge district court ruled per
curiam that the railroad could not make a claim of confiscation so
long as it would not incur long run losses in its overall system. "11
There was no confiscation, explained the court, where the question
was "actually one of degree of profits as opposed to over-all net loss."' 1"
The net loss cases would seem to sustain the view that permission
to abandon rail service can constitutionally be denied even though
railroad stockholders are earning a very low return or even no return
at all on their investment. If this is so, then stockholders of the rail-
roads included in Conrail would seem to have only limited ground
to complain of a taking should Conrail's estimated going-concern
value be less than liquidation value-for a similar shortfall in capi-
talized earnings would not have been confiscatory had the original
railroads continued in operation indefinitely.' °a
The entitlement of creditors seeking abandonment is more ambig-
uous. Ratemaking in its conventional Hope setting does not provide
much guidance, since a company by definition must be solvent in or-
der to have any return on equity. However, there are other guides.
First, there is a telling practice in ICC abandonment proceedings.
To demonstrate that a line is running at a loss and hence is suitable
for abandonment, a carrier cannot count as expenses either deprecia-
tion'0 6 or normalized maintenance' 07-even though these may be
103. [W]e have no reason to think that the Supreme Court would not adopt the
same standard of confiscation for abandonment cases that it has adopted for rate
cases. Consequently, we hold that no confiscation results from an order of the In-
terstate Commerce Commission denying the abandonment of rail services which are
shown to be unprofitable, as long as there is no net loss to the over-all system.
228 F. Supp. at 694.
104. Id. Though the Northwestern Railroad's net income would in fact have been
increased by resuming service, id., its parent corporation, the Southern Pacific Railway,
would have enjoyed larger net revenues in the event of an abandonment. Id. at 693.
Thus, the court's adoption of the net loss theory was not dicta.
The railroad challenged net loss doctrine on appeal and in application for rehearing
(see Jurisdictional Statement for Appellant at 3, Northwestern Pac. R.R. v. ICC, 379 U.S.
132 (1964); Petition for Rehearing for Appellant at 2), but the decision was affirmed
without opinion. 379 U.S. 132 (1964) (per curiam), rehearing denied, 379 U.S. 984 (1965).
105. Admittedly, in a situation where abandonment permission was denied and the
same railroad company continued in operation indefinitely, the stockholders of the
old railroad would retain a residual claim on any unanticipated upside gain and on
any value left in a future liquidation. In contrast, when the assets of the railroad are
exchanged for Conrail securities and these are distributed among investors according to
the absolute priority rule, some or all stockholders may be wiped out, with no residual
claim in the event of unexpectedly successful Conrail operations or future liquidation.
106. See Chicago & NAV. Ry., 275 I.C.C. 759, 773-74 (1951) (depreciation on roadway
structures not considered a savable expense); New Mexico Cent. Ry., 233 I.C.C. 147, 149
(1939).
107. See New York, N.H. &- H.R.R., 324 I.C.C. 345, 351 (1965) (normalized main-
tenance cannot be counted as out-of-pocket expense to determine whether operations
of branch line of insolvent carrier have been profitable; minimum expenditures neces-
sary for safe operations in next five years are of "primary importance" in determining
public convenience and necessity).
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necessary to preserve the value of creditors' security. At least at times,
the concern seems to be for out-of-pocket operating expenses neces-
sary for keeping the line in physical operation.108
Second, a strong argument can be made that the abandonment
rights of the estate of a railroad should not depend on the particular
capitalization with which the railroad financed its investment in trans-
portation property. If the classification of the source of investment
as debt or equity determines what amount must be earned in net
operating income in order to deny abandonment, it would oddly bias
the usual criteria for the railroad's choice of capital structure. For
instance, in a railroad company that was solvent but economically
unprofitable, the equity owners would greatly increase their advan-
tage by selling themselves bonds (essentially an internal exchange of-
fer of bonds for stock). After any subsequent default, they could apply
for abandonment and demonstrate that the same shortfall-the dif-
ference between liquidation value and going-concern value-against
which they had no complaint as equity owners now amounted to an
unconstitutional taking. "Leveraging," in times of industry decline,
would take on a new and peculiar sense. Apart from such overt ma-
nipulation, an extreme difference in abandonment entitlement be-
tween debt and equity would introduce arbitrariness into the capitali-
zations that the ICC would allow in financings and in conventional
reorganizations. Though using debt as some proportion of the capi-
talization would minimize the cost of capital, it would carry with
it the great disadvantage of mandating abandonment of service in
situations where equity capital would not.
The dependence of the cost of any form of capital on the extent
of its right to precipitate abandonment is apparent. But where the
"purchased expectations" of bondholders are not clear, it seems un-
108. In at least one application for complete abandonment, reviewed by a three-
judge court under Judge Friendly, the standard used for allowing abandonment ulti-
mately came fairly close to actual operating expenses. In City of New York v. United
States, 337 F. Supp. 150 (E.D.N.Y. 1972), users of the Bush Terminal Railroad tried to
annul an ICC order authorizing complete abandonment. The proceeding was remanded
to the ICC for consideration of the environmental impact of abandonment; given the
remand, the ICC was directed to consider as well whether the offer of rail users to
pay a $25 surcharge would adequately ameliorate the carrier's financial problems. Id.
at 162-63. The ICC again authorized abandonment, and the court affirmed. City of
New York v. United States, 344 F. Supp. 929 (E.D.N.Y. 1972). But it is interesting to
note that the case for denial of abandonment was evidently regarded as an arguable
one by the court. "[W]e do not find the case for abandonment of the Railroad's
operations quite so overwhelming as the Commission's supplemental report suggests
.... h" Id. at 933. If operations could have been brought to the break-even point, an im-
mediate source of capital found for equipment rehabilitation and replacement, and some
amount set aside toward the gradual repayment of the railroad's current liabilities, the
tenor of the opinion suggests that the court might have sustained an ICC order denying
abandonment.
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desirable, by retrospective divination, to introduce a rigid difference
between the abandonment rights of debt and equity. Where Congress
has wished to allow for a form of financing with ironclad security,
it has been able to do so explicitly, as in the provision for exclusion
of equipment trust financing from any modification of terms in § 77
reorganizations0 9 or the Conrail reorganization.'" One wonders also
how one would define, in a scheme of rigid differentiation, the aban-
donment rights of unsecured creditors, or of secondary debtors-
corporations whose sole function is to lease lines to an operating rail
company and distribute the lease rental among their own shareholders.
The secondary debtor is an unsecured creditor of the main operating
company, yet its owners are mere equity holders.
Finally, as noted in the initial discussion of the Brooks-Scanlon
cases, the only adjudicated instances of a constitutional right to aban-
don involve railroads which could not be made to yield any net op-
erating income whatever. 1' That such precedent should be extended
to give bondholders a right to the proceeds of a dismantling whenever
debt service is impaired seems the more radical act.
109. Bankruptcy Act § 77(j), 11 U.S.C. § 2050) (1970).
110. Rail Act § 303(b)(3), 45 U.S.C. § 743(b)(3) (Supp. IV 1974).
111. See note 31 supra.
400
Vol. 85: 371, 1976
